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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order reducing felony battery on
a law enforcement officer charges to misdemeanors and remanding them to the
magistrate division.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In an encounter with police, Cesar Gabriel Castrejon head-butted Gooding
police officer Christopher Knott and repeatedly kicked the knee of Gooding
County deputy sheriff Sabrina Becker. (P.H. Tr., p. 4, L. 13 – p. 12, L. 18; p. 15,
L. 5 – p. 20, L. 8.) The state charged Castrejon with two felony counts of battery
on a law enforcement officer. (R., pp. 24-25.) Count One charged that Castrejon
“did actually, intentionally, and unlawfully, touch and/or strike the person of
Officer Chris Knott, against his will by striking him in the face.” (R., p. 25.) Count
Two charged that Castrejon “did actually, intentionally, and unlawfully, touch
and/or strike the person of Deputy Sabrina Becker against her will by kicking her
multiple times in her knee.” (R., p. 25.)
Castrejon and the state entered a plea agreement whereby Castrejon
would plead guilty to Count One of the information. (R., pp. 37-40.) At the
change of plea hearing the district court, on its own initiative, questioned whether
the language in the information was sufficient to charge a felony, as opposed to a
misdemeanor. (01/17/17 Tr., p. 3, Ls. 7-21.) The prosecutor represented that
the inclusion of the misdemeanor language was in the nature of a “clerical error”
that he had intended to address before trial, and that he had called defense
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counsel’s attention to it in the plea negotiations. (01/17/17 Tr., p. 3, L. 22 – p. 4,
L. 9.) Castrejon’s counsel represented that he was aware that “unlawful touching
is a misdemeanor,” but that the defense concluded that the “and/or made it quite
fine” and elected to proceed with the plea agreement because the “Appellate
Court would probably say it was sufficient” even though there is “misdemeanor
language in it.” (01/17/17 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 11-23.) The district court, however,
concluded that both touching and striking were misdemeanors, and therefore the
court lacked “jurisdiction over a felony offense.” (01/17/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 19 – p. 8,
L. 2.) Therefore, the district court ordered the case remanded to the magistrate
division. (01/17/17 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 2-3; R., p. 42.)
The state filed a notice of appeal timely from the order of remand. (R.,
pp. 44-46.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court erroneously conclude the information charged only
misdemeanors?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred Because The Information Charged Felonies For Striking
A Police Officer
A.

Introduction
The district court held:
Given the way that Counts I and II are charged as unlawful
touching and/or striking, I find that that is the language that is
excepted out in subsection (3) of 18-915, so I do not believe that
the Court has jurisdiction over a felony offense, so I’m going to
remand this matter back to magistrate court for further proceedings.

(01/17/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 22 – p. 8, L. 3.) The flaw in the district court’s reasoning is
that, although battery on a law enforcement officer by “touching” is a
misdemeanor, battery on a law enforcement officer by “striking” is a felony. The
information therefore charged both a felony and a misdemeanor,1 and the district
court erred by ordering the case remanded to the magistrate division.
B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review.

State v. Thompson,

140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,
405, 94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).

The prosecutor argued the misdemeanor “touching” was an included offense of
the felony “striking.” (01/17/17 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 11-23.)
1

4

C.

The Plain Language Of The Statute Provides That Striking A Police Officer
Is A Felony
“When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of the statute,

which are the best guide to determining legislative intent.” Leavitt v. Craven,
154 Idaho 661, 667, 302 P.3d 1, 7 (2012) (internal quotes, brackets and citation
omitted). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, “legislative history
and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering
the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.”

Verska v. Saint Alphonsus

Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011).
Review of the plain language of I.C. §§ 18-915(3) and 18-903 shows that striking
an officer is a felony.
Under the plain language of the applicable statute, there are five actions
that can constitute battery (force, violence, touching, striking, or causing bodily
harm), all separated by the disjunctive “or”:
Battery defined. A battery is any:
(a) Willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of
another; or
(b) Actual, intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another
person against the will of the other; or
(c) Unlawfully and intentionally causing bodily harm to an
individual.
I.C. § 18-903 (italics and underlining added).2 Any battery under this definition,
“except unlawful touching as described in section 18-903(b), Idaho Code,”

A violation of I.C. § 18-903 alone is a misdemeanor punishable by up to six
months in jail and a fine of up to $1000. I.C. § 18-904. Because the victims in
this case were police officers, punishment would be doubled. I.C. § 18-915(1)(b).
2
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committed on a peace officer under certain conditions is a felony. I.C. § 18915(3).

Because all five acts that constitute battery are set forth with the

disjunctive “or,” and because only “touching” is excluded from the felony battery
on a peace officer statute, using force, using violence, striking, or causing bodily
harm are all batteries that qualify as felonies under I.C. § 18-915(3).
The information charged Castrejon with battery by both touching “and/or”
striking the officer victims. (R., p. 25.) As set forth above, committing a battery
on a law enforcement officer by “touching” him or her is not a felony under
I.C. § 18-915(3), but committing a battery by “striking” an officer is such a felony.
Because Castrejon was charged with striking the victim officers, he was charged
with a felony.
The district court concluded that both touching and striking were excluded
from the felony provisions of I.C. § 18-915(3). (01/17/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 22 – p. 8,
L. 2.) The statute, however, exempts only “unlawful touching as described in
section 18-903(b)” and does not exempt any other manner of committing a
battery, including striking. I.C. § 18-915(3). Because the plain language of the
statute exempts only touching, but does not exempt force, violence, striking or
causing bodily harm, the district court misread and misapplied the statute.
The state charged felonies when it charged Castrejon with striking two
police officers. The district court’s conclusion that striking a police officer is not a
felony, but only a misdemeanor, is contrary to the plain language of the
applicable statute and therefore error. The district court committed reversible
error in its order remanding the charges to the magistrate division.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s
order remanding the case to the magistrate division and remand for entry of the
plea or other proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of June, 2017.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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